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Abstract
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This paper studies the governance structure of state-
owned enterprises in the water and electricity sectors of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Through a unique 
dataset, the paper compares 44 leading state companies 
of the region based on an aggregate measure of corporate 
governance and six salient aspects of their design: 
board, chief executive officer, performance orientation, 
management, legal framework, and transparency/
disclosure. The results indicate the need for improvement 
in areas such as the selection and appointment of 
directors to the board and the performance-orientation of 
the enterprises. The paper also highlights the importance 
of discussing the management of state-owned enterprises 
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in the wider context of public sector governance, 
with particular focus on accountability. Moreover, it 
recognizes the role of accountability as central in the 
management of state-owned enterprises, recommending 
a better understanding of regulation and performance 
management. The paper finds a positive correlation 
between corporate governance and the utilities’ 
performance. Among the different aspects of corporate 
governance, performance orientation and professional 
management seem to be the highest contributors 
to well-performing state-owned enterprises. State-
owned enterprises in the electricity sector show higher 
governance levels than those in the water sector. 
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The capacity to recognize government corporations and their governance as a subject of research in 
its own right liberates us from the comparative static analysis of the past, and opens up a dynamic new 
field for the future. (Whincop 2005)  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Latin America has recaptured the interest of 
the development community. After the wave of privatizations that characterized the end of the 
1980s and the 1990s, the still significant levels of public provision in sectors such as water and 
nationalizations in others have caused both academics and development organizations to seek a 
deeper understanding of the performance of public utilities in infrastructure. From a “one model 
fits all approach”, government and international donors adopted a more pragmatic view of the 
provision of infrastructure services. The challenges of infrastructure investment, together with the 
need for innovative management, also provided space for the discussion of new themes such as 
public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
Current research on the subject has focused on the concept of Corporate Governance in State-
owned  Enterprises.  Led  by  the  work  of  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development (OECD) and supported by the concepts and tools of New Public Management, this 
approach conceives state enterprises as corporations driven by incentives that reward efficiency 
and transparency. Although adapted to the public sector, the notion of corporate governance is 
intended to reflect as close as possible the incentives that exist in a private enterprise. In the 
particular case of SOEs, corporate governance is used to refer to the organization of decision-
making in a public corporation. 
The  paper  focuses  on  the  Corporate  Governance  (CG)  of  SOEs  in  the  water  and  electricity 
distribution sectors of Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC). It takes into account public 
companies with full state ownership or partial state ownership of at least 51 percent of total 
shares.  
While the ultimate goal of this paper is to help SOEs improve their sector performance through 
effective CG reform, our corporate governance measures are intended to develop benchmarks that 
allow  for  comparisons  among  companies  in  LAC.  Corporate  governance  benchmarking  is 
conducted through different governance measures. Six salient aspects of the institutional design 
of state-owned enterprises are assessed: Board composition, performance, and evaluation; CEO 
performance  and  evaluation;  companies’  performance  orientation;  the  quality  of  companies’ 
management; the legal and organizational framework; and mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing 
financial and non-financial transparency. 
Particular importance is given to the impact of corporate governance on companies’ performance. 
This  relationship  is  tested  using  a  unique  dataset  containing  information  of  45  leading  state 
corporations.  Results  indicate  the  need  for  improvement  in  areas  such  as  the  selection  and 
appointment of directors to the Board and the performance-orientation of the enterprises.  
The paper is divided in six main sections. Section 2 presents a literature review of the debates 
surrounding  the  characteristics,  structure  and  governance  of  SOEs.  Section  3  contains  the 
methodology of the paper; it describes the theoretical framework, the levels of analysis, and the 
indexes  used  to  measure  SOE  governance.  Section  4  provides  a  description  of  the  main 
characteristics and performance patterns of SOEs in the water and electricity sectors of LAC. 
Section 5 benchmarks SOEs according to the governance measures specified above.  Section 6 3 
 
assesses  the  impact  of  corporate  governance  on  performance.  Finally,  section  7  presents  the 
conclusions of the paper.   
 
 
2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
The  existing  literature  addresses  SOEs  from  two  main  approaches.    The  first  approach 
emphasizes  the  improvement  of  the  governance  of  SOEs  as  a  step  prior  to  private  sector 
participation.  Government  corporations  are  assimilated  to  a  private  enterprise  and  their 
governance analyzed under the umbrella of corporate financing and profit maximization. This 
approach assumes that higher levels of autonomy in the management of funds, the application of 
corporate  law,  and  eventually,  the  listing  of  SOEs  will  align  internal  incentives  and, 
consequently, improve performance leading to private sector participation. This is a recipe that 
has been recommended to both competitive (telecommunications) and non-competitive sectors 
(network industries). Critics of this view emphasize that this approach only focuses on one of 
several  ways  of  organizing  state  corporations.  The  second  approach  adopts  a  more 
comprehensive,  less  dogmatic,  view  of  the  governance  of  SOEs.  First,  it  considers  the 
improvement of governance of SOEs as an end in itself and not as a strategy to privatization. 
Second, it presents SOEs with different strategies to improve performance, including but not 
limited to private sector participation methods.  
From Whincop’s (2005) perspective government corporations face three main problems. The first 
problem is related to the alignment of the interests of the government corporations’ managers 
with those of its ultimate owners, the citizens (agency costs of management). The constituency to 
whom the government corporations are ultimately accountable  –the people– stands in a dual 
relation to the government corporation. On the one hand, they are the government corporations’ 
residual claimants, as shareholders in a business corporation. On the other hand, they are also 
frequently the principal recipients of the goods and services the government corporation provides. 
This dualistic relation between the government corporation and the public makes it difficult to 
concretize  the  meaning  of  acting  in  the  best  interests  of  the  public.  The  second  problem  is 
associated with the alignment of the interests of that wielding delegated governance power over 
managers  with  those  of  its  ultimate  owners  (agency  costs  of  governance).  As  actors  in  the 
political process, questions arise regarding the extent to which these persons are inclined to use 
those government powers for political advantage. The third issue is the reduction of social costs 
associated  with  anti-competitive  behavior  by  the  government  corporation  (anti-competitive 
behavior costs). 
Whincop explores how the governance of government corporations can be evaluated in terms of 
three objectives: reduction of management costs, anti-competitive behavior costs, and costs of 
governance. He conducts that assessment from a “constituency” perspective- the major and active 
players whose interests may be affected by the governance of a government corporation and their 
relation to the ultimate principal, i.e. the public at large. Principal players are the managers, the 
empowered  political  agents,  and  a  group  of  active  stakeholders  including  customers  and 
employees. 
Vagliasindi (2008; 2009) develops a detailed review of substantial research related to theoretical 
models of Board effectiveness and ownerships structures. Although applied to the private sector, 
the literature stresses the importance of independent directors. In the case of SOEs, even more 
than in private enterprises, the appointment of directors with technical expertise and a reasonable 
level  of  independence  becomes  significantly  relevant.  Vagliasindi  also  emphasizes  the 4 
 
importance  of  external  governance  for  the  management  of  SOEs  such  as  the  role  of  the 
government agency in charge of ownership decisions and the relevance of regulation. 
Schwartz (2006) sheds light onto the discussions about the organizational model in state water 
utilities. He distinguishes two main organizational approaches, the Bureaucratic Model and the 
New Public Management Mode’, and applies them to public water utilities in Mexico. He defines 
the Bureaucratic Model as one based on the preeminence of the law and rules, composed of civil 
servants with stability and civil service careers in public administration, and organized under the 
principles of hierarchy and levels. The New Public Management framework  proposes higher 
levels of decentralization of and autonomy to government entities, the use of performance-based 
instruments  such  as performance-based  payments,  and  accountability  focused  on  results. The 
author  challenges  conventional  wisdom  about  the  effectiveness  of  New  Public  Management 
institutions to state enterprises, finding that well performing public utilities tend to display a 
stronger adherence to the Weberian ideal-type than poorly functioning public service providers. 
He  concludes  by  asserting  that  rather  than  opposite  strategies,  they  are  better  viewed  as 
complementary.  Whereas  the  Bureaucratic  model  focuses  on  reducing  patronage  and 
depoliticizing the management of the utility, the New Public Management model emphasizes the 
levels of service that must be delivered by the utility (New Public Management model). 
Whether we consider corporate governance as a means to privatization or as an end in itself, both 
approaches  lack  empirical  evidence  about  the  impact  of  governance  on  performance.  For 
instance, there is no assessment about the contributions of corporatization to access to finance or 
productivity, or the role of shares in non-profit oriented enterprises. Moreover, the emergence of 
regulation, as the institutional response to the efficiency of utilities, has not been discussed and 
analyzed in the context of state providers. This paper attempts to fill some of those gaps.  
 
 
3.     METHODOLOGY/FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
 
We study the governance of SOEs in infrastructure through seven measures. Selected measures 
attempt  to  describe  the  main  variables  of  the  governance  dynamics  that  characterize  a  state 
corporation. For that purpose, we created an aggregate measure of corporate governance and six 
salient aspects referred to specific corporate governance themes. The five themes address the 
following CG aspects: the legal framework of the corporation, the composition and quality of the 
Board and CEO, the quality of the company’s bureaucracy, the performance orientation of the 
enterprise, and the mechanisms to guarantee the transparency of the financial and non-financial 
information.  
 
Information was collected through surveys sent to 110 different utilities of the region in both the 
electricity  and  water  sectors.  Final  respondents  were  44  state-owned  enterprises  of the  Latin 
American  and  the  Caribbean  region.  We  included  both  public  companies  with  full  state 
ownership and companies where despite there is private investment state ownership is at least 51 
percent of total shares (only a few in this category). Our aggregate measure includes a sixth 
variable related to the listing of the company in the stock exchange. 
The methodology proposed to benchmark SOEs of  the LAC region is based on various criteria. 
For  this  last  purpose, the paper compares  government  enterprises  based  on  different  tiers  or 
thresholds.  Utilities  were  grouped  based  on  their  corporate  governance  status  in  different 
indicators.  Utilities  within  Tier  1  (T1)  are  those  SOEs  that  have  “desirable”  conditions  for 
corporate governance (their responses scored highest in the survey’s questions).  Utilities within 5 
 
Tier 2  (T2)  are those  SOEs  that  meet  “minimum”  corporate  governance  conditions.  Utilities 
within Tier 3 (T3) are those SOEs that do not meet the “minimum” conditions to implement our 
benchmark model of corporate governance. 
 
Answers were valued between 0 (worst) and 1 (best). In selecting the questions and giving values 
we had in mind the benchmark of a public enterprise that is corporatized and subject to same 
conditions, in terms of access to finance and auditing, than any other private enterprise. We 
adjusted the benchmark to sector specificities such as the mechanisms to appoint the Board of 
Directors, economic regulation, and performance-based orientation.  
 
Different from other approaches to the governance of SOEs, we also included the study of the 
selection, appointment, salary, and educational levels of the staff. Previous approaches have only 
emphasized the role of the Board and its relationship with the shareholder/s. In the infrastructure 
sector, the role of the staff of a state enterprise is vital to good management. Because most of 
these enterprises are not profit-oriented, not allowing to focus on revenues as parameters of 
good  performance,  and  also  because  a  good  bureaucracy  is  a  good  filter  to  political 
intervention,  we  believe  that  a  an  index  that  reflects  the  professionalism  (given  by 
educational levels, hiring criteria, and rewards) of the staff might give us a good proxy of the 
performance of the enterprise. 
 
Last  but  not  least,  our  corporate  governance  measures  are  neither  intended  nor  focused  on 
governance effectiveness. The sole purpose of the CG measures is to develop benchmarks that 
allow us to compare companies in LAC and identify trends and projections.  
 
  The following table describes the different components of your framework of analysis and the 



































































participation of civil society in 
decision-making, annual 
performance report, auditing 
of company’s accounting, 
financial disclosure standards, 
involvement of consumers 
and civil society 
representatives in the 
company’s decision-making, 
criteria to appoint the 
company’s top authorities, 
criteria and mechanisms to 






































































are close to 
private sector 
standards. 
We emphasize a decision-
making process where civil 
society has a say in the 
company’s decisions 
(accountability effect) and 
with a strong focus towards 
the publication of institutional 
and performance information. 
We also prioritize the 
involvement of private 
auditors and the publication 
of financial information 
through best international 
practices. We also give 
importance to the ways the 
company hire its employees 
(open process). 
Model of an SOE 
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4.   CHARACTERISTICS OF SOEs 
 
COMPONENT 1: OWNERSHIP/LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The  majority  of  the  companies  in  our  sample  set  have  been  corporatized,  adopting  different 
corporate modalities. The most common is to subject SOEs to the same legal framework as a 
limited liability enterprise, what in Latin American countries is called  Sociedades Anónimas, 
Capital Variable, etc. SABESP in Brazil is the only company in our sample that is publicly listed, 
and, hence, subject to more quality controls by authorities and investors. 
 
Corporatized enterprises are also subject to corporate law, with an institutional design closer to a 
private company than a non-incorporated enterprise. Around 70 percent of SOEs can go bankrupt 
in case of insolvency, have a Board of Directors, and ownership is organized under a shares’ 
structure. Despite the high number of companies organized under shares, the relevance of this 
approach is not sufficiently clear. It is undoubtedly critical in SOEs with private investors such as 
SABESP and Aguas de Saltillo (Mexico). However, in the cases of companies fully owned by the 
State or with institutional shareholders such as unions and other government units, its usefulness 
is  more  controversial  and  questionable.  The  lack  of  pursuing  profits  contradicts  a  share’s 
structure. The purpose of shares is precisely to trade commercial rights in the market in order to 
increase their value and consequently a company’s income. In a non-profit oriented enterprise, a 
share’s structure is more representative of a division of power within the company than a tool to 
enhance  profitability.  The  pursuit  of  benefits  is  only  required  in  35  percent  of  the  cases. 
Moreover, with the exception of one company (SABESP), the rest of the companies are not listed 
in stock markets.  
 
If a system of shares is only thought as a mechanism to distribute power among shareholders, 
without any implications in terms of the pursuit of profits, then decision-making in SOEs would 
need to be revisited. Other approaches such as voting mechanisms and the inclusion of veto 
powers  from  independent  directors  could  be  considered.  Nevertheless,  more  analysis  is 
recommended to fully understand the dynamics and political economy of decision-making in 
state-owned enterprises. 
 
The landscape of companies with shares is diverse. There are cases such as Aguas de Rio Negro 
S.A. in Argentina where even though companies are organized as private enterprises, shares have 
not been implemented. Others have distributed profits but at very low levels. In some cases, 
shares have been used to reimburse users for the money spent in the extension of the network 
(Peru).  There  are  also  companies  that  have  achieved  significant  profits  despite  not  being 
integrated by shares. This is the case of enterprises such as Empresas Públicas de Medellin in 
Colombia which transferred in 2010 around two hundred thousand dollars to the Municipality of 
Medellin, the company’s shareholder.  
 
Ownership  structure:  Almost  half  of  our  sample  of  SOEs  has  some  sort  of  private  sector 
participation. Nevertheless, the percentages, with some exceptions, are very small. Exceptions are 
the cases of SABESP in Sao Paulo (Brazil) and Aguas de Saltillo S.A. (Mexico), where private 
investors account for 49.7 and 49 percent, respectively, of the shares. In the case of SABESP, 
24.6 percent of these shares are traded in the national stock market (Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, 
or BOVESPA) and 25.1 percent in the New York Stock Exchange. In the case of Aguas de 
Saltillo, 49 percent of the shares are owned by Interagbar de México S.A. de C.V. (Aguas de 
Barcelona). Private investors not only own the company but they are also responsible for the 
operation of the service (there is a concession agreement). 7 
 
 
The  rest  of  the  companies  have  different  arrangements  to  allow  private  sector  participation. 
Shares are owned by employees, trade associations, citizens, and users. With different degrees, 
they do not account for more than 10 percent of total shares. SOEs in Argentina (AySA, ABSA, 
ARSA, and SATSA) show one of the largest percentages of this type of private investors - all of 
whom are employees of the enterprise represented by their unions.  Trade associations complete 
the picture of small investors in SOEs  in LAC. This is the case of associations such  as the 
National Association of Coffee Producers of Colombia (Federación Nacional de Cafeteros) in the 
enterprises Centrales Eléctricas Norte de Santander S.A. and the Association of Manufacturers of 
Pichincha (Camara de Industriales de Pichincha) in the enterprise Eléctrica de Quito S.A. 
 
Authorities that exercise power over the company: Ownership rights are exercised in the majority 
of corporatized companies by the sector or line minister. Other authorities involve a common 
minister such as the Minister of Finance and auditing bodies. In those cases of SOEs that are 
subsidiaries of larger state enterprises, ownership rights are exercised by its holding company.  
 
Regulatory role: Economic regulation of SOEs is a critical aspect to sustainable management of 
SOEs particularly in its connection to the setting of tariffs and the quality standards of service 
provision. This is perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of the provision of services by 
state-owned enterprises. Critical aspects of economic and technical management are at risk of 
misuse  by  politicians.  Only  a  very  specific  division  of  roles  between  the  State  as  policy 
formulator, provider, and regulator can provide a framework to enforce economic sustainability 
and quality of service from SOEs. 
 
In our survey, we asked state enterprises about the regulator with the final decision making power 
in the sector. We also asked about regulatory authorities in specific aspects such as tariffs, quality 
standards,  and  service  expansion.  Our  data  indicate  a  high  percentage  (72  percent)  of  state 
enterprises regulated by a regulatory agency. The remaining 28 percent are regulated by the line 
ministry or through combined efforts of a regulatory agency and the line ministry. 
 
Things change when we get into the details of regulation. Focusing on four mains aspects of 
regulation  such  as  tariffs,  expansion,  quality  of  service,  and  technical  standards,  we  found 
interesting results. The consideration of the four regulatory issues combined indicates that both 
the government and the regulatory agency have the same scope in regulating state enterprises. 
According to our data, in 29 percent of the cases a sole regulator is the regulatory authority, and 
in 28 percent of the cases is the government the only authority. Self-regulation, or the regulation 
of the companies’ policies by the enterprise itself, represents 22 percent of the cases in the region. 
Finally, in 21 percent of the cases, regulation is exercised by a combination of the regulatory 
agency, the government, the company and/or other authority. 
 
The consideration of each aspect also brings interesting results. We found that the involvement of 
the government is more significant  when it comes to critical issues such as tariff levels and 
expansion of service. However, government involvement is less significant when it is related to 
less  controversial  service  related  issues  such  as  technical  standards  and  service  quality.  The 
distribution of competencies between regulatory agencies and the line ministry shows that critical 
decisions are taken by the latter. 
 
Tax  regime:  Another  component  included  in  our  Legal  Framework  Index  is  the  tax  regime. 
Ideally, we would expect SOEs to be subject to the same tax obligation as private enterprises 
which would in turn level the playing field of SOEs vis-à-vis other private enterprises, allowing 
for greater efficiency. 8 
 
 
Our data indicate that more than half of the SOEs in our sample have some exemption or discount 
of their tax obligations. Only 43 percent of our sample declared not having any type of fiscal 
privilege. 
 
COMPONENT 2: BOARD AND CEO 
 
We  focus  on  the  composition,  qualifications,  and  performance  evaluations  of  the  Board  of 
Directors and CEO of SOEs. We prioritize a Board of Directors where political discretion is low, 
where members of the Board are selected based on pre-defined criteria (particularly related to 
merits  and  experience),  and  whose  performance  is  assessed  based  on  different  governance 
arrangements. We also enquire SOEs about the salary levels of their directors. 
 
Considering the space for political collusion and capture of a public sector enterprise, we consider 
the formalization of institutions to appoint and evaluate directors to be of critical importance. The 
more the emphasis on transparency and accountability of the decision-making authorities of a 
SOE, the higher the possibilities of improving performance. 
 
Requirements for selection: Our data indicate that there is a prevalence of political authorities in 
the appointment of the Board of Directors. This is not surprising and is consistent with the fact 
that these are state enterprises whose main shareholder or owner is the government. The data also 
indicate that the selection of Directors from the enterprise’s management, its employees, or even 
from private independent experts is very low. In more than half of the cases, directors of the 
Board come from the public sector. Requirements for selection are not a common practice in our 
sample of SOEs. In only 36 percent of the cases, the law establishes the need to select Directors 
upon certain criteria. Among those which have an established procedure, sector experience and a 
university degree seem to be the most common requirements. Only in 2 percent of the cases, is 
political independence a pre-condition to be eligible as a Director to the Board.  
 
Very  few  companies  have  developed  specific  criteria,  beyond  legal  impediments,  to  select 
Directors to the Board. FONFAE, in Peru, developed a Guideline that regulates the appointment, 
payments,  and  obligations  of  directors  to  state  companies.  This  directive  asserts  that  only 
directors with a university degree and with 5 years of professional experience can be appointed to 
the Board. They also need to comply with ethical and legal requirements. They are not considered 
employees of the enterprise and are hired under a professional services contract (Locación de 
Servicios). The regulation also establishes their obligations and responsibilities.  
 
Empresas Públicas de Medellin, in Colombia, has developed a Corporate Governance Code in 
which it addresses, among other issues, the criteria to appoint directors to the Board. In addition 
to a university degree and related professional experience, the directive requires that five out of 
the nine members of the Board be independent. EPM, also Columbia, is one of the few state 
enterprises that require independence as a criterion for appointment. 
 
Salary levels: Salary levels have little to do with private sector standards. Only 8 percent of the 
SOEs match their Directors’ salary levels to the private sector. The majority of Directors earn 
salaries that are similar to those received by public servants with similar responsibilities. 
5A large 
percentage of directors are paid through stipends and in 15 percent of the cases being a director is 
considered an honorific position.  
                                                 
5 We do not estimate the value of the stipends that directors receive. The question was only related to salary levels, 
although some companies stated that the stipends that they pay to directors reflect, or not, market standards. 9 
 
 
Big companies pay higher salaries than small companies. Forty percent of the big companies pay 
market level salaries or salaries that are lower than the private sector but higher than a similar 
position in the public administration. Thirty percent of small companies pay similar salaries than 
the public sector. Moreover, smaller companies seem to use stipends more frequently than big 
companies. 
 
Because of the high number of stipends in the electricity sector, we cannot determine which 
sector pays higher salaries. Electricity companies use stipends more often than water companies 
(32 percent in the case of electricity companies and 17 percent in the case of water companies), 
and because we do not quantify the value of the stipend we cannot determine whether the 32 
percent of companies that use this mechanism pay higher remunerations than companies in the 
water sector. 
 
Responsibilities: Whereas the Board is more influential in issues such as financing and debt, the 
management of these enterprises seems to have a critical role in hiring and determining levels of 
production. Both Board and managers share similar levels of influence in aspects such as the 
allocation of State subsidies and the determination of wages.  
 
Evaluation of performance: One of the most critical issues in the management of SOEs is the way 
their performance is assessed. In a private enterprise, the generation of revenues is the main 
criteria to either reward or dismiss directors. Hence, their organizational structure and strategies 
reflect this orientation. In some state enterprises, the dispersion and sometimes opposing interests 
of stakeholders prevent the formulation of consistent strategies and policies. It is because the 
majority  does  not  seek  to  maximize  profits  that  the  identification  of  objectives  becomes 
confusing.   
 
We  attempted  to  capture  the  ways  directors  are  evaluated.  Because  of  the  confusion  and 
dispersion of objectives, we assume that an institutional arrangement through which the Board 
identifies goals and strategies and by which directors are accountable for, would contribute to 
efficiency. We asked SOEs about the ways their directors are evaluated, if any. We focused on 
the methodologies used by SOEs to set objectives, the instruments through which performance is 
assessed, and the consequences for not reaching agreed targets. Although a significant number of 
SOEs responded positively saying that directors were evaluated, when it came to sharing the 
details  of  evaluation  mechanisms  responses  were  not  sufficiently  clear,  preventing  the 
establishment of definite conclusions or correlations about performance evaluation.  
 
When asked about the methodology/criteria to carry out these assessments, only 17 percent of the 
SOEs responded by the identification of a specific criteria. The majority (89 percent) expressed 
that  although  Directors  are  indeed  assessed,  there  is  no  specific  criteria  for  that  purpose, 
confirming the existence of ad-hoc, more informal, mechanisms of evaluation. Moreover, when 
asked about the instruments used to undertake the evaluation, very few identified a particular 
mechanism against which performance is evaluated. Similar to private enterprises, Directors are 
assessed at the end of the fiscal year by the SOE shareholders.  
 
COMPONENT 3: MANAGEMENT/STAFF 
 
This governance measure captures the composition and characteristics of the enterprise’s staff by 
levels of education, type of training, legal status, salary and benefit levels, hiring, and incentives. 
Employees are a central part of SOEs of the infrastructure sector. They share a common vision 
regarding  their  role  in  the  enterprise,  contributing  to  the  improvement  of  the  enterprise’s 10 
 
performance. Moreover, they may also become a filter to political decisions as a professional and 
well organized bureaucracy will oppose to measures that hinder their career prospects. 
 
The bulk of employees in SOEs are those dedicated to operational work. Thirty-seven percent are 
skilled  workers  and  31  percent  are non-skilled  workers. Twenty  percent are  non-operational, 
administrative workers. A small percentage, around  15 percent of employees in SOEs, has a 





Board-Managers: The SOEs in our sample show diverse educational backgrounds both in the 
members of the Board and the rest of the staff. Members of the Board show reasonable academic 
backgrounds. In 70 percent of cases, all the members of the Board have a university degree and in 
30 percent of the cases only some members have a university degree. When asked about graduate 
studies, 15 percent of the companies said that all the members of the Board had postgraduate 
degrees, 55 percent of the SOEs said that some of the members of the Board had a graduate 
degree. In 30 percent of the cases none of the members of the Board had a graduate degree. 
 
Educational levels are higher at the CEO and manager levels. In 56 percent of the cases, CEOs 
had postgraduate degrees, in 38 percent of the cases CEOs only had an undergraduate degree, and 
in only 6 percent of the cases CEOs did not have a university degree. When it comes to managers 
of the enterprise, in 78 percent of the cases all managers had a university degree and 22 percent 
said that some of their managers had a university degree. With respect to the graduate background 
of managers, 12 percent of the companies said that all their managers had a university degree and 
that in 58 percent of the cases some of the managers had a university degree. In 30 percent of the 
cases, none of the managers of the companies had graduate degrees. 
 
Professionals:  We  also  asked  SOEs  about  the  educational  levels  of  those  employees  with  a 
university degree, called “profesionales” in Latin America. Academic formation is lower. Only 3 
percent of the respondents said that all their professionals had graduate degrees and that in 60 
percent some of their professionals had graduate degrees. In 37 percent of the cases, none of the 
professionals had graduate degrees. 
 
Lower level staff: We asked skilled and non-operational workers about their university degrees. 
We define skilled workers as those employees (permanent and non-permanent) who , without a 
university degree, perform tasks that require a special knowledge and practice. We only included 
positions  that  are  operational.  Non-operational  workers  are  employees  (permanent  and  non-
permanent)  that  do  not  have  a  university  degree  and  perform  non-operational  tasks 
(administrative work) such as secretaries, assistants, etc. 
 
In the case of skilled workers, only 10 percent of the SOEs said that all their qualified workers 
had a university degree. In 33 percent of the cases, none of them had a university degree, and the 
remaining 57 percent said that some of their skilled workers had an undergraduate degree. Non-
operational  workers  show  lower  educational  levels.  In  46  percent  of  the  cases,  none  of  the 
operational workers had obtained a university degree and in only 8 percent of the cases all the 
non-operational employees had a university degree.  
 
Labor regime: A common assumption regarding the management of SOEs is the rigidity of labor 
schemes that prevent the restructuring of the labor force. According to our data, in 62 percent of 
the cases, employees are hired under private law and in the remaining 32 percent they are subject 11 
 
to civil service rules. The majority of the labor force is hired under a permanent basis (those that 
are hired under a special regime such as those under Labor Agreement or “Convenio Colectivo de 
Trabajo”). According to our data, on average, 84 percent of the employees were hired under a 
regime that gives different levels of stability. 
 
Selection procedures: A crucial aspect related to the proficiency of the human resources of state 
companies is the mechanism to select employees. Political discretion and the undue influence of 
trade unions were frequently mentioned in the past as drivers of overstaffing and low capacity. In 
order  to  identify  mechanisms  of  selection,  we  grouped  staff  in  the  following  categories: 
managers, professionals, skilled workers, unskilled workers, and non-operational workers. The 
majority  of  the  responses  indicated  the  use  of  external  competition  as  the  primary  way  of 
selecting personnel. This is more evident when it comes to more qualified positions up to the 
managerial level. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that the rest of the options, around half after 
counting for external selection, indicated more discretional, less transparent ways of hiring staff.  
 
In the case of unskilled workers, 33 percent of the staff is selected discretionally. The rest of the 
mechanisms  include  internal  competition  (7  percent)  and  other  combinations  of  internal 
competition with external selection (24 percent). A similar situation can be seen in the case of 
non-operational workers where 25 percent of the workers are selected both discretionally and by 
sector unions. In the case of managers, 50 percent of companies indicated that their managers 
were selected discretionally, 34 percent through external competition, and 15 percent through an 
internal competitive process.  
 
Performance evaluation: In addition to open and meritocratic-based selection processes, SOE can 
benefit from a system of incentives that rewards good performance. We asked SOEs about the 
criteria to reward performance and the ways in which good performance is rewarded. Criteria 
includes years in the company, performance, and the discretional determination of rewards for 
employees. Options for rewards include promotion, salary increase, and bonuses. The majority of 
SOEs reward their staff through a combination of two main criteria: years in the company and 
performance (30 percent). The second set of companies uses either years in the company (23 
percent)  or  performance  (13  percent)  as  their  exclusive  criteria  to  reward  employees.  A 
significant  number  of  companies  (21  percent)  use  only  discretionality  or  a  combination  of 
discretionality  and  performance/years  in  the  company  to  reward  their  employees.  Very  few 
companies  (i.e.  the  Compania  Pernambucana  de  Saneamiento  in  Brazil)  pay  employees  a 
performance-based bonus.  
 
Incentives payments: We also asked SOEs about the existence of performance-based incentive 
payments. Incentive payments in the public sector have been considered a way of motivating the 
civil  service  and  of  increasing  efficiency  and  effectiveness.  Although  there  is  no  empirical 
evidence on the consequences of this type of reforms in the public administration, its use in state 
enterprises  still receives  both  voices  of  doubt  and  support.  In  our  sample  of SOEs,  only  20 
percent  of  companies  have  some  type  of  performance-based  payment.  Companies  such  as 
EDENORTE (Dominican Republic), the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (Mexico), Aguas de 
Saltillo S.A. (Mexico), the Companhia de Agua e Esgoto do Ceara (Brazil), and Grupo CEEE 
(Brazil), manifested having different arrangements to reward good performance. 
 
Salary levels: The salary levels of employees are, on average, higher than the income levels of the 
members of the Board. Board members that receive salary levels similar to private sector or 
higher than those received in the public administration constitute 30 percent of our sample. Board 
members  with  salaries  similar  to the  public  sector  are  34  percent  of the  companies.  Among 
employees, 84 percent receive salaries that are either similar to private sector levels or in between 12 
 
the public and the private sectors, with only 16 percent that receive public sector salaries. Salary 
benefits follow the same trend. Ninety percent of SOEs pay their employees benefits that are 
similar (26 percent) or higher (2 percent) than the private sector or between private and public 
sector standards (60 percent). 
 
COMPONENT 4: TRANSPARENCY/DISCLOSURE 
 
The transparency index measures the existence of mechanisms that allow for a better publication 
of the company’s financial and non-financial information, the involvement of civil society in 
decision-making, the disclosure of financial information, and the independent auditing of SOEs’ 
accounts.  
 
Quality and content of websites: One of our measures of transparency is the quality of  each 
company’s websites. The majority of the companies, with one exception, have a website. When it 
comes to the contents of companies’ websites, four main aspects were emphasized: annual report, 
financial accounts, corporate structure (chart), and mechanisms to receive consumers’ claims and 
suggestions. On the contrary, little importance is given to issues such as performance statistics 
(coverage, quality of service, costs, etc), vacancies, the names and backgrounds of Directors to 
the Board, procurement processes (stages, prices, etc), and educational content. 
 
ElectroSureste in Peru, SABESP in Brazil, and EPM in Colombia have developed well designed 
websites with useful information for consumers, investors, and the general public. ElectroSureste 
offers an e-procurement system which allows participants to read biddings guidelines, deadlines, 
and  results.  It  also  publishes  the  projected  time,  responsible  authorities,  and  purpose  of  the 
different users’ claims. It also provides consumers with a virtual office to attend their questions 
and concerns. 
  
Consumers’ involvement: The second component of this section addresses the involvement of 
consumers  and  the  society  in  the  formulation  of  the  companies’  policies.  Civil  society 
participation, through different ways and degrees, can be an important factor to reduce political 
discretion in the management of the company. In 90 percent of the cases participation is not 
mandatory. In other words, the company is not obliged to request the views of users or other 
stakeholders on different aspects related to the delivery of services. Both mandatory and non-
mandatory mechanisms include different consultation processes on issues such as tariff increases 
and infrastructure works (whose value is higher than a certain threshold). Some SOEs such as Luz 
y  Fuerza  del  Centro  in  Mexico  invite  NGOs  such  as  Mexican  Transparency  (Transparencia 
Mexicana) and Trade Associations to witness the implementation of some of their projects. 
 
Instruments of accountability: An important instrument of accountability in SOEs is the annual 
report which describes the company’s achievements after the identification of different outcomes. 
In  our  sample  of  SOEs,  the  majority  of  the  enterprises  publish  an  annual  report  of  their 
performance. The question does not go into the details of its components and accuracy, but a 
closer look at some of them allows seeing large differences -from complete and detailed reports 
to the simple enumeration of works developed during the fiscal year. 
 
Auditing of financial accounts: A critical aspect of transparency in SOEs is the auditing of their 
financial accounts. Although traditionally subject to public sector scrutiny, a significant number 
of  SOEs  are  also  audited  by  private  auditors.  In  our  sample  of  SOEs,  the  majority  of  the 
enterprises are audited by both government audit agencies and private auditors. Only 5 percent of 
SOEs are audited exclusively by the government and 30  percent are audited only by private 
auditors. Forty percent use international accounting standards to report financial information. 13 
 
 
The majority of SOEs also publish their audited accounts. Eighty percent of the companies that 
publish their audited accounts use their website and other means such as newspapers and other 
printed publications. Only 10 companies out of our total sample do not publish their audited 
accounts. 
 
Composition of the Board: Only 7 percent of the Boards have a member withdrawn from these 
sectors. Moreover, in a very small percentage (15 percent) of the cases, Board members are either 
appointed through the intervention of the Parliament or by the private sector (i.e. professional and 
experts).  
 
Mechanisms to select the company’s staff: We also considered the selection and appointment of 
the  staff  of  the  enterprise.  Selection  mechanisms  show  three  main  approaches:  i)  external 
competition; ii) internal selection process; and iii) discretional appointment. External competition 
is more frequent in the selection of skilled workers and less common in managers, unskilled 
labor, and non-operational workers. 
 
COMPONENT 5: PERFORMANCE ORIENTATION 
 
This component addresses the existence of mechanisms to evaluate the performance of SOEs. We 
intend to identify those arrangements that allow for a performance-based management of the 
enterprise.  In  other  words,  a  management  that  is  oriented  towards  the  fulfillment,  and 
achievement,  of  objectives  and  goals.  We  believe  this  is  one,  among  many,  of  the  ways  of 
increasing state companies’ accountability, particularly because of its orientation towards results. 
A performance oriented management, if properly implemented, would facilitate the identification 
of objectives and, consequently the efficiency of the company. This is particularly the case in 
SOEs, where incentives for performance are difficult to create.  
 
We asked companies about mechanisms to evaluate: i) the performance of the enterprise; ii) the 
performance  of  the  members  of  the  Board;  iii)  the  performance  of  the  CEO;  and  iv)  the 
performance of the rest of the management. The Performance Index reflects the mechanisms that 
exist at these four levels. We structure our analysis of performance orientation in SOEs through 
three dimensions. The first dimension is related to the process of setting objectives. The second 
dimension is related to the instruments used to set objectives and its enforcement. The third 
dimension is related to the authority that conducts these assessments.  
 
Objective  setting:    The  answers  from  the  SOEs  were  not  sufficiently  clear  about  the  ways 
performance objectives are established. The majority of responses focused on the instruments 
through which evaluation takes place. A few, though, were explicit about targets and the process 
of identification and establishment. 
 
State companies in the Dominican Republic are under the authority of the DR Corporation of 
Electricity  Companies,  a  holding  responsible  for  the  ownership  of  public  companies  in  the 
electricity sector. ELECTROSUR, one of DR state corporations, agrees on different objectives 
depending on the government unit. For instance, it discusses objectives related to coverage and 
quality of service with the government, efficiency and revenues issues with the holding company, 
and within the company issues related to work-related accidents, environment protection, etc. 
 
Colombia  presents  a  different  approach  to  objectives’  setting.  The  control  agency 
(Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios) requires utilities to prepare different plans 
(finance,  strategic,  action)  based  on  pre-selected  criteria  and  indicators.  The  evaluation  of 14 
 
financial and non-financial performance of SOEs takes place through an independent audit by a 
private firm. The assessment focuses on two aspects: corporate and social. The first evaluation is 
related to financial indicators. The second is related to administrative and technical parameters, 
and also to quality standards. The agency also classifies utilities based on their risks. This is for 
instance the mechanism applied to Centrales Eléctricas del Norte de Santander in Colombia. 
Another  set  of  companies  coordinate  policy  goals  and  objectives  through  Performance 
Agreements.  Some  companies  in  Paraguay  and  Brazil  sign  a  Performance  Contract  with 
government authorities through which they set objective and monitoring strategies. In Paraguay, 
the  electricity  utility  (ANDE)  signs  a  performance  agreement  with  the  line  minister  and  the 
ownership unit (Consejo Supervisor de Empresas del Estado). The agreement is enforced by the 
ownership unit through periodical reports that state the level of achievement of targets. Grupo 
CEEE and CAESB in Brazil also sign a performance contract with policy formulation authorities. 
Other state utilities established different objective that are linked to Development Plans. For 
instance, SOEs in Costa Rica set, together with the sector minister, development goals which are 
monitored in the context of the National Evaluation System. Finally, some utilities use scorecard 
methodologies. These are the cases of ANDE in Paraguay, and both ERSSA and CENTROSUR 
in Peru. 
 
Instruments: The Strategic or Business Plan seems to be the most common mechanism used by 
SOEs to set objectives, and the annual report the way through which the company informs about 
the fulfillment of these achievements. Some companies also use public hearings as a way for the 
members of the Board to explain the results of the enterprise. It is not clear from the responses 
what  constitutes  a  performance  agreement  and  what  a  business  strategy.  Three  companies 
specifically recognized the use of a performance contract to guide the strategic direction of the 
enterprise. Other mechanisms that complement business plans are the balance score card and the 
systems of evaluation that are linked to national/local development strategies. 
 
Evaluation authorities: The assessment of the performance of SOEs is dispersed among several 
authorities. The line ministry, the regulator, and auditing agencies seem to be the principal centers 
of accountability for state enterprises. In some cases, the company is self-assessed through its 
Board  of  Directors.  Although  less  common,  some  companies  are  subject  to  the  control  of a 
specific agency such as the SOEs Oversight Council of Paraguay and the Solidarity Fund of 
Ecuador. 
 
In the case of Companhia Riograndense De Saneamento (CORSAN) in Brazil, which is subject to 
a Performance Agreement, there is a Committee specially created to monitor and enforce the 
contract. There is also a Corporate Governance Committee of SOEs responsible for performance 
as well. 
 
The Parliament has little say in the accountability of SOEs. This is also a trend that can be seen in 
the  context  of  regulatory  agencies  where  the  Parliament  is  very  limited  in  overseeing  the 
outcomes  of  the  regulatory  policies.  Although  Parliament  oversight  is  particularly  seen  in 
Parliamentary or Westminster type of democracies, it would be also desirable to see a greater 
involvement  of  the  Congress  in  the  discussion  of  management  issues  related  to  SOEs’ 
performance. The involvement of political authorities other than the Executive could constitute a 
balance to political discretion. 
  
Regulatory  agencies  in  Colombia  have  a  decisive  influence  in  monitoring  a  company’s 
performance. In the case of the electricity sector, both public and private utilities need to hire an 
independent  consultancy  firm  to  evaluate  its  annual  performance,  based  on  selected  criteria. 
Directive 72/02 of the Energy Commission establishes the need for action and business plans that 15 
 
define the companies’ strategies. It defines financial and non-financial indicators through which, 
and based on the assessment of the independent auditor, they qualify the risk of the company. 
 
Assessment  of  Board  of  Directors  and  Staff:  Another  aspect  considered  in  the  Performance-
Oriented Index is the assessment of the performance of both the members of the Board and the 
CEO or the Executive Director. The assessment of their behavior is not very strong, with little 
formal arrangements establishing the specific criteria against which to evaluate results.  
 
Executive directors seem to be subject to higher levels of scrutiny than the members of the Board. 
This is not surprising, and is consistent with the idea of the CEO as the main responsible for the 
management of the enterprise. Arrangements to evaluate the performance of the CEO go from 
less formal (even ad-hoc) mechanisms to more detailed structures of assessment. In the majority 
of the cases CEO’s performance is approved by the Board of the enterprise. In some of these 
cases, specific criteria have been established, but in others there seem to be no agreed procedures. 
The  most  detailed  mechanisms  include  Memoranda  of  Understandings  (MoUs)  between  the 
government  and  the  executive  director  or  the  assessment  of  his/her  performance  against  the 
performance  agreement  or  mechanism  through  which  the  company  is  evaluated  (such  as the 
balance score card). 
 
In the case Uruguay, members of the Board and the Executive Director are evaluated through the 
same procedures as other members of the company (Reglamento de Calificaciones de OSE). In 
the case of EMELNORTE, the Solidarity Fund signs a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Executive  Director  of  the  Company.  In  CORSAN,  the  CEO  is  evaluated  based  on  the 
Performance Contract.  
 
 
5.     BENCHMARKING ANALYSIS 
 
 
This  section  compares  countries  within  LAC  in  terms  of  the  different  CG  indexes.  The 
assessment also includes a simple regional average for each of the governance dimensions.  
 
A.   AGGREGATE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Our aggregate measure of corporate governance is a composite index of the different aspects of 
the  governance  of  state-owned  enterprises:  legal  framework,  performance-orientation, 
professional management, Board and CEO, and transparency and disclosure. This index gives 
higher weights to the listing of SOEs in stock markets. 
 
The majority of companies are within T3 levels; none of the SOEs show up in what we consider 
an ideal type of company (or T1 level). Heterogeneity seems to be higher in companies in T3 
levels, where the standard deviation is 0.054 compared to 0.039 of companies in T2 levels. The 
second  large  number  of  companies  is  within  T2  levels,  those  companies  that  meet  average 
corporate governance requirements. 
 
The Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo (SABESP) is the Latin American 
company that is closer to T1 levels, followed by Electrohuila (Ecuador), Jamaican Public Service 
Co.,  Grupo  CEEE  (Brazil),  Aguas  del  Saltillo  SA  CV  (Mexico)  and  Empresas  Publicas  de 
Medellin  (Colombia).  These  companies  are  among  those  in  T2  levels,  showing  a  more 
homogenous composition than enterprises in T3. 16 
 
 
B.- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS 
 
COMPONENT 1:  OWNERSHIP AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
We  privilege  a  legal  framework  in  which  companies  are  corporatized  and  subject  to  similar 
standards as other private companies. We also give priority to companies whose policies are 
established and monitored by a specialized government agency. The index gives higher scores to 
companies  regulated  by  independent  commissions  or  agencies  and  subject  to  the  same  tax 
obligations as any other private enterprise. The public listing of companies have a privileged 
score, since we assume that a company subject to the standards of the Stock Commission has 
better corporate governance. 
 
 
The Legal Soundness Index reflects the relatively good position of the majority of companies of 
the region. Most of government corporations have been corporatized and their functioning subject 
to commercial law. On the other hand, there is only one company that has been listed. SABESP in 
Brazil is listed both in domestic and international stock markets.  
 
COMPONENT 2: BOARD AND CEO 
 
Our measure of the governance levels of the Board of Directors and the CEO attempts to capture 
the quality of both the mechanisms to appoint as well as the qualifications of the members of the 
Board and the CEO. It prioritizes a Board of Directors where political discretion is low, where 
members of the Board are selected on pre-defined criteria (particularly related to merits and 
experience), and whose performance is assessed based on different governance arrangements. 
The more the emphasis on transparency and accountability of the decision-making authorities of a 
SOE, the higher will be the possibilities of improving performance. 
Governance levels are higher at the level of CEOs than at the level of the Board. Moreover, our 
measure of CEO’s governance shows one of the few occasions where companies are at T1 levels. 
Three companies of our sample (EMELNORTE, ELECTROHUILA, and QUINDIO) fit in T1 
standards. All of them belong to the electricity sector. Generally, they are appointed by the Board 
of Directors, are hired under private sector rules, and their performance monitored according to 
































































































Source: LAC SOEs Governance Database, The World Bank, 2009.
Legal Soundness17 
 
High levels of political influence may determine the lower governance levels of the Board vis-à-
vis the CEO. Whereas the selection and appointment of the directors to the Board may not be 
based on strict meritocratic rules, the selection of CEOs is restricted in the majority of the cases to 
pre-determined criteria. This includes, but is not limited to, the need for a professional degree and 
a given level of sector expertise.  
 
Similarly  to  other  cases,  T2  levels  in  both  Board  and  CEO  show  more  homogeneity  than 
companies in T3. Companies such as ESSAP, ANDE, and EMCALI do not have a Board of 




COMPONENT 3: MANAGEMENT/STAFF 
 
This index measures the composition and characteristics of the enterprise’s staff by levels of 
education,  type  of  training,  legal  status,  salary  and  benefit  levels,  hiring  and  incentives. 
Employees are a central part of SOEs of the infrastructure sector. They may become a filter to 
political decisions as a professional and well organized bureaucracy can oppose measures that 


































































































































































































The Professional Management Index shows the highest percentage of companies at T3 levels.  
COMPONENT 4: TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE 
The transparency index measures the existence of mechanisms that allow transparent disclosure 
of the company’s financial and non-financial information, the involvement of civil society in 
decision-making,  and  the  independent  auditing  of  SOEs’  accounts.  The  three  Tier  analysis 
indicates that the majority of SOEs have minimum conditions to achieve the open disclosure of 
their performance and accounts. In the sample, no SOEs fulfill the desirable criteria. 
 
Together  with  the  Legal  Index,  our  measure  of  transparency  also  shows  a  large  number  of 
companies within T2 levels. Uruguay’s Administracion de las Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE), 
Brazil’s Empresa Bahiana de Aguas e Saneamento S.A. (EMBASA), and Brazil’s Grupo CEEEA 
are the companies with the highest scores. The most significant heterogeneity is found among T2 
companies. 
 
COMPONENT 5: PERFORMANCE ORIENTATION 
This component addresses the existence of mechanisms to  evaluate the performance of SOEs. 
We intend to identify those arrangements that allow for a performance-based management of the 
enterprise.  In  other  words,  a  management  that  is  oriented  towards  the  fulfillment,  and 
achievement,  of  objectives  and  goals.  We  believe  this  is  one,  among  many,  of  the  ways  to 


























































































































































































performance oriented management, if properly implemented, would facilitate the identification of 
objectives and, consequently the efficiency of the company. This is particularly the case for SOEs 
where because of the lack of private investors, incentives for performance are difficult to create.  
Together with the levels of professional management, the performance-orientation of SOEs is one 
of the aspects where SOEs in LAC show the largest deficiencies. This applies not only to the poor 
focus on external accountability but also to the lack of performance-orientation of the enterprise, 
especially in the evaluation of its staff. 
 
Our measure of professional management finds three SOEs (CAGECE and Grupo CEEE from 
Brazil and AySA from Argentina) among the top state corporations of the region in terms of the 
quality of its bureaucracy. Paraguay’s ANDE is one of the few companies with performance-
based schemes (although our measure does not reflect actual levels of implementation). 
 
6. IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON PERFORMANCE 
 
This section explores the correlations between various dimensions of corporate governance and 
the operational performance of utilities in the water and electricity distribution sectors of LAC. 
We correlated the dimensions described in the previous sections with the level and growth rates 
of the main performance indicators for utilities in the water and electricity sectors. We ran the 
governance  indicators  with  the  pool  of  utilities  and  analyzed  the  relationship  between  the 
governance indicators and each sector separately. 
We use utilities’ sector performance data from 250 public and private utilities in the electricity 
sector, covering 26 countries and 89 percent of the connections in the region. It contains more 
than 20 variables indicating output, input, operating performance, quality and customer services, 
and prices. Data for the water sector includes annual information on 1700+ public and private 
utilities of 16 countries, covering 59 percent of the water connections in the region. Variables for 
water are similar to those in electricity. The results are presented in the tables in Annex A. 
Legal Framework: When we analyzed the correlation between these governance indicators and 
the growth rates of the set of performance indicators, results suggested that our measure of legal 
framework is associated with a decrease in average quality of service and an increase in average 
tariffs. When we evaluated each of the sectors separately, we observed that in water utilities there 

































































Source: LAC SOEs Governance Database, The World Bank, 2009.
































higher labor productivity. In electricity distribution we observe the opposite trend. The main 
results hold.  
Board of Directors and CEO: The results suggest that the higher the scores in these dimensions, 
the lower the distributional losses and service coverage. The results also show that the higher the 
qualifications  of  the  Board,  the  higher  the  level  of  average  tariffs.    Growth  rates  in  these 
performance  indicators  seem  not  to  be  significantly  affected  by  the  Board  and  CEO 
competitiveness. However, when the sectors are analyzed separately, the change in performance 
in  water  seems  to  be  more  sensitive  to  these  dimensions.  Moreover,  these  dimensions  are 
associated with a higher continuity of the service. Our measure of CEO competitiveness is more 
related  to  positive  changes  in  coverage  and  reduction  of  average  tariffs,  while  Board 
competitiveness is associated with positive changes in labor productivity and micro-metering. For 
the electricity sector, our results were not significantly different than zero. 
Management/Staff:  When  we  compare  corporate  governance  indicators  and  operational 
performance  in  electricity  and  water,  only  labor  productivity  had  a  direct  correlation  with 
professional management. Nonetheless, when we disaggregate the results for the water sector, 
management is associated with higher levels of labor productivity and lower distributional losses. 
In addition, it is also related with positive significant changes in the continuity of the service, 
sewerage coverage, labor productivity, and micro-metering. 
Transparency and Disclosure: Utilities with higher transparency and disclosure standards are 
associated with higher levels of service coverage and lower average tariffs. When we analyze 
each sector separately, data illustrates that electricity utilities have significant coverage increases 
and tariff reductions. The correlation results are stronger in the water sector where we find that 
transparency  is  related  with  higher  levels  of  efficiency,  lower  non-revenue  water,  higher 
potability, metering, and coverage.   
Performance Orientation: As expected, this index is highly correlated with high levels of labor 
productivity and low distributional losses, as well as significant changes in coverage. Most of 
these results hold when we assess each sector separately.  
Aggregated  Corporate  Governance:  We  find  that  overall  corporate  governance  is  highly 
correlated with high levels of labor productivity and tariffs, as well as with low distributional 
losses. We also observed positive changes in coverage of the service. The correlation results are 
stronger in water utilities than in electricity providers. For water companies, the data highlight 
that  overall  corporate  governance  is  associated  with  low  non-revenue  water,  high  quality 
standards, coverage, labor productivity, and high average tariffs. When we analyze the impact of 
governance on changes in performance  in this sector we find significant contributions in the 
improvement  of  the  continuity  of  the  service,  labor  productivity,  metering,  and  sewerage 
coverage, as well as a reduction in average tariffs. 
The  assessment  of  the  correlations  between  corporate  governance  and  sector  performance  in 
SOEs is the first of its kind. Results are promising: corporate governance is associated with high 
standards of utilities’ performance and growth rates. As expected, performance orientation and 
professional management characteristics seem to be the highest contributors to performance; all 
the other dimensions associated with some of the performance indicators. Results in the water 
sector  were  stronger,  presumably  because  of  the  higher  number  of  water  utilities  in  our 
questionnaire. Further analysis should include more disaggregated data and a higher coverage of 
the sample. It would also be critical to explore political economy approaches that address issues 21 
 
of causality, sequencing, and complex interaction effects that contribute to the explanation of 
SOEs’ governance.  
 
 
7.     CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Governance arrangements in SOEs in water and electricity distribution present a wide spectrum 
of designs. While private enterprises are characterized by the adoption of standard corporate 
strategies,  SOE  standards  vary  depending  on  a  country’s  institutional  systems  and  the 
characteristics of the service. Thus, the variety of arrangements calls for a careful systematization 
of governance practices and the identification of successful experiences. Since SOEs are part of 
the public sector, factors of good and bad performance are directly and indirectly related to the 
overall governance of a country or province. 
This paper emphasized the need for a corporate structure that prevents political intervention, 
rewards  performance,  and  is  subject  to  public  scrutiny.  Additionally,  it  focused  on  the 
qualifications of the enterprise’s staff. Although we tried to capture as many variables from state 
enterprises as possible, the focus of this work was on institutional design. In other words, it did 
not consider the actual effectiveness of governance procedures.  
Like a private enterprise, the organizational structure and decision-making of an SOE reflects the 
interests and involvement of its shareholders, and hence, their strengths and weaknesses. Because 
these enterprises are part of the public administration, and thus subject to its governance schemes 
and leadership, they can either benefit or be affected by the performance of its bureaucracy. 
Government corporations remain a complex and unique organizational mode, caught between the 
norms of public sector governance and corporate governance (Whincop, 2005). Hence, although 
mimicking private enterprise arrangements in SOEs might cause significant improvements in 
management,  it  can  also  contribute  to  the  consolidation  of  corruption  and  the  lack  of 
accountability  in  those  enterprises  with  little  controls  and  vested  interests  from  governing 
stakeholders. 
The comparison of SOEs in terms of different sector criteria allowed the identification of higher 
governance levels in companies of the electricity sector. It also found better corporate levels in 
companies with different degrees of private sector participation over those fully owned by the 
state. We did not find an association between the level of subsidies and corporate governance. 
And  it  was  not  possible  to  find  a  relationship  between  access  to  finance  and  corporate 
governance. Finally, company size only seems to matter in the water sector. 
Our focus on five components of CG allowed us to identify the major pitfalls in issues related to 
SOE performance orientation and the selection and composition of the Board of Directors. While 
companies do seem to plan their strategies, what is unclear is the way in which they set and 
enforce  their  business  objectives.  Generally,  SOEs  are  subject  to  the  influences  of  different 
authorities, particularly during their planning process. Moreover, our assessment of the impact of 
corporate  governance  in  the  performance  of  government  utilities  identified  the  performance 
orientation and the professional management of the enterprise as the highest contributors to well-
performing utilities. 
Rather than focusing on profit maximization, SOEs emphasize social goals and human capital 
improvements. Thus, manpower is a critical factor of state enterprises’ performance. Moreover, in 
several  cases  the  company’s  bureaucracy  has  built  a  prestige  for  good  performance  that  has 
prevented the intromission of political interests. In our sample of SOEs, directors to the Board 22 
 
have, on average, high educational levels. Almost all CEOs of public companies have a university 
degree and in fifty six percent of the cases they also have postgraduate studies. 
A  major  gap  is  the  limited  transparency  in  the  appointment  of  employees.  From  Board  of 
Directors  to  low  levels  of  employees,  a  significant  percentage  is  hired  either  internally  or 
discretionally, with low levels of competition. Even though internal hiring is also a common 
pattern for private enterprises, in state enterprises the space for collusion is bigger and, hence, 
measures need to be taken to avoid low levels of professionalism and political appointees. 
Good management of SOEs presents government bureaucrats with different challenges. First and 
most important, state enterprises face conflicting goals that affect the establishment of a business 
strategy. Several departments usually compete for moving their agenda into the priorities of the 
company,  affecting  the  prioritization  of  the  service.  Most  importantly,  intromissions  in  the 
companies’ business adopt informal, ad-hoc, approaches, that prevent the company from making 
these  costs  explicit.  The  lack  of  profit-orientation  prevents  SOEs  from  identifying  ways  to 
improve efficiency and performance. Because low revenues can be compensated by government 
subsidies, efforts to make the company sustainable fall to second place. Third, poor accountability 
systems (being at the regulatory or management levels) prevent the development of an ownership 
structure that triggers efficient behavior from senior management. 
Although it is too early to formulate policy recommendations, both the literature and the practices 
in the region help in identifying some potential actions. Considering public enterprises as private 
companies can in some cases lead to wrong diagnoses and, hence, reform plans. Some, if not the 
majority of SOEs in water and electricity distribution are not driven by profits, making difficult 
the  identification  of  corporate  incentives.  As  stated  by  Whincop,  it  makes  sense  to  design 
governance  appropriate  to  the  form  rather  than  to  emulate  the  incentive  structure  of  other 
alternatives. This calls for the identification of governance schemes that focus on the factors that 
may trigger efficiency, reducing the space for corruption and capture by vested interests.  
It is in this context that accountability emerges as the main governance aspect of SOEs. In the 
cases of companies with high levels of corruption and inefficiency, accountability systems should 
prevent discretional management (both from management and political authorities) and create the 
incentives  for  good  performance.  Regulation  and  performance-based  management  could  be 
considered complementary ways of achieving these goals; although good care needs to be taken 
in creating checks and balances such as parliamentary oversight and state auditing. 
A final observation is related to the importance of tailoring governance strategies to a company’s 
realities. This paper analyzed cases of both full and partial state ownership. Among those with 
partial  state  ownership,  particularly  those  with  significant  private  sector  participation,  a 
governance design reflecting the incentives of private enterprises seems more appropriate. For 
companies with significant gaps in both performance and management, transparent accountability 
mechanisms should be considered. A third group of companies, those with full state ownership, 
characterized by good sector performance and management need to strike a balance between 
private sector orientation and public accountability, i.e. profit maximization behavior and social 
responsibility appeasing behavior. Finally, governance design needs to take into consideration 
sector differences. Technology and sector dynamics also determine the nature of management. 
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ANNEX A: Additional tables 
 
Table A.1: Correlation between CG indexes and performance – Water and Electricity distribution 
Sectors (in levels) 
 
 
Table A.2: Correlation between CG indexes and performance – Water and Electricity distribution 
Sectors (in growth rates) 
 
 
Table A.3: Correlation between CG indexes and performance – Electricity (in levels) 
 
 

















Legal Soundness -0.41 0.05 -0.26 0.29 0.39
CEO Competitiveness -0.39 0.08 -0.33 0.08 0.36
Board Competitiveness -0.22 -0.14 -0.12 0.10 0.14
Professional Management -0.24 0.13 -0.08 0.34 0.22
Transparency & Disclosure 0.14 -0.16 0.37 0.24 -0.31
Performance Orientation -0.25 0.28 -0.09 0.26 0.22









Legal Soundness 0.04 -0.31 0.14 -0.10 0.26
CEO Competitiveness 0.05 -0.10 0.35 0.01 0.06
Board Competitiveness -0.06 -0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.00
Professional Management 0.03 -0.11 0.07 0.12 0.01
Transparency & Disclosure -0.02 -0.04 0.15 0.10 -0.37
Performance Orientation 0.18 0.09 0.30 0.13 0.01














Legal Soundness 0.02 0.39 0.32 -0.32 -0.41 0.42 0.42
CEO Competitiveness 0.17 0.28 0.41 -0.02 -0.51 -0.19 0.22
Board Competitiveness -0.01 0.47 0.44 -0.03 -0.23 0.09 0.50
Professional Management 0.08 0.21 0.10 0.05 -0.07 0.40 0.18
Transparency & Disclosure -0.19 -0.18 0.00 -0.07 0.20 0.09 -0.23
Performance Orientation 0.06 -0.15 -0.04 0.14 0.31 0.23 -0.26














Legal Soundness -0.10 0.36 0.30 0.19 -0.10 0.15 -0.01
CEO Competitiveness -0.01 0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.19 -0.08 -0.26
Board Competitiveness -0.09 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02
Professional Management 0.24 0.09 0.13 -0.15 -0.31 0.02 -0.30
Transparency & Disclosure -0.03 -0.03 0.16 0.32 0.17 -0.28 -0.49
Performance Orientation 0.28 -0.20 -0.14 0.03 0.04 -0.34 -0.16






Table A.6: Correlation between Corporate Governance indexes and performance – Water Sectors 

















Legal Soundness -0.33 0.34 -0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.29 -0.01 0.54 -0.48
CEO Competitiveness -0.02 -0.52 -0.12 -0.13 0.26 0.23 -0.23 0.07 -0.02
Board Competitiveness -0.23 -0.12 0.31 0.29 -0.04 0.01 0.12 0.15 0.03
Professional Management -0.27 -0.13 0.24 0.23 -0.07 0.31 0.11 0.53 -0.09
Transparency & Disclosure -0.29 0.09 0.31 0.39 0.17 -0.11 0.32 0.26 0.26
Performance Orientation -0.37 -0.23 0.62 0.35 0.18 0.17 0.03 0.46 0.21
















Legal Soundness 0.11 -0.37 0.25 -0.24 0.13 -0.04 0.17 -0.05 -0.03
CEO Competitiveness -0.04 0.70 0.17 0.24 0.33 -0.52 -0.38 0.01 -0.17
Board Competitiveness -0.10 0.36 0.22 0.02 -0.21 -0.03 -0.32 0.32 0.28
Professional Management -0.21 0.27 0.16 -0.23 0.25 -0.23 -0.20 0.29 0.36
Transparency & Disclosure 0.09 0.32 -0.01 0.28 0.20 -0.13 -0.09 0.08 0.32
Performance Orientation -0.05 0.42 -0.73 -0.11 0.55 0.13 0.37 0.41 0.51
Corporate Governance -0.06 0.48 0.05 -0.04 0.39 -0.25 -0.13 0.30 0.41
Table A.5: Correlation between Corporate Governance indexes and performance – Water Sectors 
(in levels) 
 